[Learning to Fuzz]

(For the $$$)



Learning to Fuzz~$: whoami

$: Y1 NUS Student (BComp, CS)

$: Started playing CTFs in June of my last year of high school and subsequently learned how to do infosec-related research (~6 months of CTF/infosec research then 2 years of brain rot)

$: Interned at STARLabs (Oct 20 – Feb 21): CVE-2021-33760

$: Not a smart guy

Learning to Fuzz~$: Agenda

0x0: What is Fuzzing?

0x1: Tools

0x2: The Fuzzer and the Harness

0x3: Building the Harness

0x4: Testing the Harness

0x5: Running the Fuzzer

0x6: CVE-2021-33760

Learning to Fuzz~$: What is Fuzzing?

$: Using edge cases to find more edge cases
  ~: Try to execute as much of the code as possible
  ~: Systematically break every part of it

$: Find crashes with past crashes (or base cases)

$: Mutate > Test > Record Crash (if any) > Repeat



Learning to Fuzz~$: Tools

> WinDBG/WinDBG Preview (For Windows)

> GDB + Plugins (For Linux)

> Source Code if any (Chromium source etc.)

> Decompiler like IDA/Ghidra

> Visual Studio (For Windows apps)

> Any IDE you like with (usually) GCC/G++

Learning to Fuzz~$: The Fuzzer and The Harness

> We use the fuzzer to fuzz the application

> We use a harness to “activate” the library we wish to target

> Fuzzer and harness must work together

> Fuzzer runs the harness with base inputs (“start points” to mutate from)

Learning to Fuzz~$: The Fuzzer and The Harness

> Popular fuzzers exist: Peach Fuzzer, American Fuzzy Loop, etc…

> WinAFL: https://github.com/googleprojectzero/winafl

> Fuzzers can execute applications thousands of times per second!

Learning to Fuzz~$: The Fuzzer and The Harness

> Applications are big…

> Per-execution cycle is slow

> We are not always interested in the whole application, just the specific library

Learning to Fuzz~$: Building the Harness



> Decompile the library

> Find out what it does

> Run debugger to see what happens during runtime

> Replicate execution cycle without replicating the whole application

Learning to Fuzz~$: Building the Harness

```
sxe     : First-chance handling
bp      : Set breakpoint
bm      : Set symbol breakpoint

k       : View callstack (function calls)
dc      : Display double word values in given range
dps     : Display memory in given range
pt      : Step until next return

g       : Continue
p       : Step
```

Learning to Fuzz~$: Building the Harness

(e)ax: Primary accumulator (return value/input value)
(e)sp: Stack pointer

bx: Base register
cx: Count register
dx: Data register

ip: Instruction pointer
bp: Base pointer

Learning to Fuzz~$: Building the Harness

> Adobe JP2K Library: **JP2KLib.dll**

> Time-Travel Debugging is extremely useful

> If you want to try it out:
1. Disable PageHeap on Acrobat DC (Google)
2. Run Acrobat DC in WinDBG Preview
3. Drag a sample JP2K file into Acrobat DC

> **Demo**

Learning to Fuzz~$: Testing the Harness

> This is just like building an application: debug, debug and debug even more.

> Test your harness with in-app debugging as well (logging etc.)

> Test your harness in the debugger! Theory can only take you this far :^)



Learning to Fuzz~$: Running the Fuzzer

> We will make use of DynamoRIO for dynamic instrumentation -> maps library coverage

> Higher coverage = higher chance of finding crash

> We will watch for stability, coverage and executions/s and try to maximize all of them

Learning to Fuzz~$: Evaluation

> Optimizations (achieve similar coverage with less function calls etc.)

> Further reverse engineering

> Analyse your crashes -> 90% of the time they will be bogus crashes due to measures like sandboxing, exception handling etc.

> A good base input is as important as a good harness

Learning to Fuzz~$: CVE-2021-33760

> Integer underflow leading to OOB-read in Windows Explorer (IPropertyStore parsing)

```
0:000> g
(56c8.7dc4): Access violation - code c0000005 (first/second chance not available)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
Time Travel Position: B8573:0
mfsrcsnk!CMPEGFrame::DeSerializeFrameHeader+0x42:
00007ffb`2629f872 418b0e      mov     ecx,dword ptr [r14] ds:000001c7`29218504=????????

0:000> !heap -p -a @r14 address 000001c729218504 found in _DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 1c7290a1000
in busy allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: UserAddr    UserSize - VirtAddr    VirtSize)
                       1c7290a5d68: 1c729214000 4000     - 1c729213000 6000
```

Learning to Fuzz~$: CVE-2021-33760

CMP3MediaSourcePlugin::ParseHeader() -> for parsing MP3 header

CMP3MediaSourcePlugin::DoScanForFrameHeader() is called when parsing header and stores offset = 0x2282.

```
LABEL_29:
    LODWORD(v34) = offset;
    remaining_size -= offset; // 0x00000000000022e6 - 0x0000000000002282 =
                                 0x0000000000000064
    buf += offset;            // 0x000001c729214000 + 0x0000000000002282 =
                                 0x000001c729216282
    goto LABEL_30;
}
```

Learning to Fuzz~$: CVE-2021-33760

CMP3MediaSourcePlugin::DoReadFirstFrameBody() is called, then CMPEGFrame::DeSerializeFrameBody() is called with the same arguments.

```
// buf=000001c729216282, remaining_size=0000000000000064, &offset=0000003fdc7ce060

hr = CMP3MediaSourcePlugin::DoReadFirstFrameBody(MPEGFrame, buf, remaining_size, &offset);
================================================================================
0:000> k
 # Child-SP          RetAddr               Call Site
00 0000003f`dc7cdee8 00007ffb`2629f789     mfsrcsnk!CMPEGFrame::DeSerializeFrameBody
01 0000003f`dc7cdef0 00007ffb`2629aaa1     mfsrcsnk!CMP3MediaSourcePlugin::ReadMPEGFrameBody+0x49
02 0000003f`dc7cdf60 00007ffb`2629e9ce     mfsrcsnk!CMP3MediaSourcePlugin::DoReadFirstFrameBody+0x41

0:000> r rcx, rdx, r8, r9
rcx=000001c72921bea0 rdx=000001c729216282 r8=0000000000000064 r9=0000003fdc7ce060
```

Learning to Fuzz~$: CVE-2021-33760

Within CMPEGFrame::DeSerializeFrameBody(), its internal check fails as the remaining size 0x64 is less than the required size

```
if ( body_tag == 'ofnI' ) {
    LODWORD(required_size) = required_size + 0x74;
    if ( remaining_size < required_size ) // required_size = 0x74
        goto LABEL_22;
}

LABEL_22:
    CallStackScopeTrace::~CallStackScopeTrace(v13);
    return hr; //returns HRESULT 0
}
```

Offset is used in calculation again! Integer underflow occurs.

```
LODWORD(v34) = offset;
remaining_size -= offset; // 0x0000000000000064 - 0x0000000000002282 = 0x00000000ffffdde2
buf += offset;            // 0x000001c729216282 + 0x0000000000002282 = 000001c729218504
```

Learning to Fuzz~$: CVE-2021-33760

At CMPEGFrame::DeSerializeFrameHeader+0x39 (mfsrcsnk.dll+0xf869), a check is performed. Since remaining_size contains a large value, the < check is not passed. As the code executes to this stage and it tries to access the invalid pointer stored in buf, an OOB read occurs.

```
if ( remaining_size < 4 ) {
    ... // Irrelevant Code
}

v10 = *buf; // OOB Read
```

Learning to Fuzz~$: Afterword

> Fuzzing is not as easy as you think!

> Requires understanding of code execution and lots of debugging

> I am as new as everyone at this, do read up more and don’t take my word as gospel

> Blog: https://ultimatehg.github.io

[End]